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The opportunity costs of becoming a dean:  
Does leadership in academia crowd out research? 
Abstract: Researchers in academia typically perform different tasks: research, teaching and ser-
vices to the scientific community. We analyze the opportunity costs in terms of a potentially re-
duced publication productivity associated with becoming a dean in the German institutional setting 
where deans are non-professional expert-leaders who temporarily take the dean position. Theoreti-
cally, we distinguish between two different effects that relate deanship and publication productivity: 
a resource effect where publication productivity during and – as a result of potentially having de-
veloped a taste for service –also post deanship decrease as a result of a reduction of the available 
time for research and a self-selection effect where pre-deanship publication productivity is lower 
than that of peers who are not about to become dean. Based on a dataset of 1,110 business and eco-
nomics researchers from German-speaking universities, we find evidence for a resource effect with 
leadership in academia reducing research productivity during and also post deanship. We find no 
evidence of a negative self-selection effect in the sense of less successful researchers being more 
likely to take the position of a dean. Reduced research productivity during and post deanship as 
compared to those researchers that never became dean is driven by those researchers who become 
dean in later periods of their career, i.e., presumably by those who deliberately shift their focus 
away from research and towards a stronger engagement in the scientific community in their late 
career years. Early career deans, on the contrary, seem to see their deanship more as a transitory 
role and are able to compensate the reduced resources during deanship, and they also do not suffer 
from a reduced publication productivity post deanship. 
Keywords: Leadership, opportunity costs, academia, resource effect, self-selection, expert leader 
JEL-Codes: D23, D73, H83, I23, M12, M21, M5 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers in academia typically perform three different tasks: research, teaching and 
services to the scientific community (see, e.g. Evans and Meyer 2003). While there may be 
synergies between teaching and research (see, e.g. Backes-Gellner and Zanders 1989) and 
also between research and more research-related services to the scientific community (such as, 
for example, journal editing, see Aguinis et al. 2010), “one is hard pressed to find any way in 
which service to the department or institution could be anything other than a drain on research 
efforts” (Taylor, Fender and Burke 2006: 850). 
In our paper, we analyze the opportunity costs in terms of publication productivity asso-
ciated with becoming a dean in German-speaking academia, an institutional setting where 
deans are non-professional expert-leaders, that is, researchers from the department who tem-
porarily take the position of a dean for a time span of two to four years and then step back into 
the ranks (see, e.g. Krücken, Blümel and Kloke 2013). Often, and especially at an earlier ca-
reer age, researchers are rotated into the dean’s office and do not deliberately decide to be-
come a dean, while, predominantly at later career stages, researchers might also deliberately 
decide to run for the dean’s office as a result of a general shift in focus towards serving the 
scientific community. 
While it has been argued (see Goodall 2009, Goodall and Bäker 2015; Goodall, McDowell 
and Singell 2017) that expert leaders are favorable for the organization they lead (in terms of 
department members’ job satisfaction and research productivity), there are hardly any studies 
that analyze the effects of being an expert leader on the leaders themselves. So far, only Tay-
lor, Fender and Burke (2006) explore the relation between research productivity and service 
to the department on the basis of individual researchers. They do so in the context of the U.S. 
system, in which deans are mostly researchers who turned into professional managers and 
who volunteered for the position. Thus, results derived from such an institutional setting will 
be difficult to generalize to the German-speaking setting. Further, Taylor, Fender and Burke 
(2006) base their analysis on a survey in which they asked researchers for the average number 
of committee memberships and committee chairs “in a typical year” and whether they had 
been department head or program director during the last five years and relate that to research 
output within the same five years. On the contrary, our analysis is based on the German insti-
tutional setting, and is not limited to analyzing whether a researcher held an office within the 
last five years using a cross section approach, but rather looks at the whole career and relies 
on a panel dataset. Further, we test for self-selection using random effects panel regressions. 
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Studying pre-dean publication productivity allows us to explore whether differences in the 
publication productivity of deans and non-deans are the result of being or having been in the 
office or whether they can rather be traced to self-selection. As a robustness check, we also 
account for self-selection by applying panel regression analyses with person-fixed effects.  
Theoretically, we build on personnel economics and distinguish between two different ef-
fects that might explain a negative correlation between being a dean and publication produc-
tivity. Firstly, there is a resource effect involved since the time devoted to the dean’s office 
will reduce the time available for research. As a result, we would expect deans to have a lower 
publication productivity during and potentially also post deanship, though after deanship the 
effect should be weaker. Further, having served as a dean, researchers might develop a taste 
for service to the community and decide to turn to other service tasks afterwards, reducing the 
available time resources for research and publication productivity post deanship. Secondly, for 
those that are not rotated into the office but deliberately decide to become a dean (even 
though it is not their turn), there might also be a negative self-selection effect where those that 
show a low publication productivity have a higher probability to run for the dean’s office in 
search of an alternative role that makes up for not being among the successful researchers. As 
a result, we would expect deans to have a lower pre-dean publication productivity.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a dataset of 1,110 business and economics researchers 
from Austria, Germany, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland and covers the years 
1965 to 2010. Empirically, we find that during deanship and in the post-dean period, deans in 
our dataset had a lower publication productivity than their peers – hinting at a resource effect 
where research is crowded out by academic leadership. Judging from their pre-dean publica-
tion productivity, deans in our sample period were not a negative self-selection. Rather, re-
searchers that were about to become dean were undistinguishable from their peers when it 
comes to their pre-dean publication productivity. Hence, there was no self-selection in the 
sense of less successful researchers being more likely to take the position of a dean. We also 
find that the lower publication productivity during deanship and in the post-dean period were 
driven by those researchers that came into office in later career years, i.e., not by those re-
searchers who were most likely to have been rotated into the office. This might indeed have 
been the result of researchers taking the position of a dean because of a general shift of focus 
– away from research and towards a stronger engagement in the scientific community. Re-
searchers who became dean late in their careers might hence be more likely to devote more 
time and effort to their office and they might have also – parallel to becoming a dean – opted 
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for more engagement in the scientific community in general – at the expense of publication 
productivity during deanship and in the years to follow. Since we control for career age, the 
latter effect is not a general career age effect. Hence, it is not that the older researchers in gen-
eral are more likely to focus less on publications. But if they come into office, they are more 
likely to do so at the expense of publication productivity. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three major ways: Firstly, we are the first to em-
pirically analyze the opportunity costs of becoming a dean in a setting where deans are non-
professional expert-leaders who temporarily take the position of a dean and then typically step 
back into the ranks. Secondly, other than Taylor, Fender and Burke (2006), we also regard 
pre-dean publication productivity, thus shedding light on a potential process of self-selection 
into the office. Thirdly, we speculate on different theoretical explanations for the observed 
links between becoming a dean and publication productivity pre, during and post deanship.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 unfolds our theoretical per-
spective and derives our hypotheses. In section 3, the data, variables and empirical strategy 
are presented. Section 4 provides the results and section 5 concludes. 
2 Theory and Hypotheses 
Theoretically, we expect to observe a negative link between deanship and publication 
productivity. This negative link can be traced back to two different effects: a resource effect, 
and a self-selection effect. 
Resource Effect: Firstly, a researcher that becomes a dean will have less time available 
for research (see also Taylor, Fender and Burke 2010). Given that time is a limited resource, 
adding another task to the load reduces the time budget for research. Time is an essential input 
into research. Reducing this input will generally result in a reduction of output (Fox 1992; 
Hattie and Marsh 1996; Manchester and Barbezat 2013). As a result, if the resource effect 
dominates, we would expect deans to have a lower publication productivity during deanship. 
Likewise, also post-deanship, publication productivity might be reduced, because during 
deanship less projects will be started, and/or because after the term in the office researchers 
might take on new service functions, having developed a “taste for service” during their dean-
ship. Thus, developing a taste for service during deanship might add to the, arguably not too 
strong, post-deanship resource effect. Our first two hypotheses thus read: 
H1: During deanship, researchers have a lower publication productivity.  
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H2: Post-deanship, researchers have a lower publication productivity.  
Self-Selection: Secondly, there also might be negative self-selection where those that 
show a low publication productivity are more likely to run for the dean’s office in search of an 
alternative role that makes up for not being a successful researcher. If academics who place 
less emphasis on research (or are less skilled in doing so) volunteer for dean positions, then 
the publication productivity of deans would also be lower. Deanship would then, however, not 
cause a lower publication productivity, but a lower publication productivity would make it 
more likely that the respective academic seeks an alternative role as a dean. As a result, we 
would expect deans to have a lower pre-dean publication productivity. Our corresponding 
third hypothesis reads: 
H3: Pre-deanship, researchers have a lower publication productivity.  
3 Data, Variables and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Data 
Our study is based on a unique and partly self-collected dataset of researchers in busi-
ness and economics from Austria, Germany, and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. It 
contains information on researchers’ journal article output as well as information on year of 
PhD, age, gender, and discipline (business administration vs. economics). The data were col-
lected via the online research monitoring portal initialized by the German Economic Associa-
tion (“Portal Forschungsmonitoring”) and quality-approved by the Thurgau Institute of Eco-
nomics and the Konjunkturforschungsstelle KOF at ETH Zurich. In the publication data of the 
research monitoring portal used for our study, all publications of all faculty members are col-
lected on the basis of publication databases, and the names of faculty members are reported 
by the faculties who have every interest to report a full list of names because the list of faculty 
members determines the ranking result of the faculties. Thus, unlike in the Handelsblatt rank-
ing on individual researchers, there is no opt-out option for the database as such, and hence, 
the research monitoring portal contains the full sample of business and economics researchers 
at universities in Germany, Austria and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Journal 
publication output is measured in co-author- and quality-adjusted Handelsblatt points (see 
Krapf 2011 for the details). 
To collect data on deanships we surveyed all researchers in the dataset in 2011. To sub-
stantiate the information on the deanship variable, we additionally hand-collected information 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273371 
6 
 
on deanship from the CVs of those professors that did not respond to the survey. We limited 
our additional data collection on professors since being a dean requires being a professor in 
the German-speaking system. 
The survey was conducted in 2011, which is why we restrict our analysis to publication 
output up to and including 2010. Due to missing data points, we end up with 22’717 yearly 
publication observations on 1’110 researchers, 138 of which were dean at least once within 
the sample period. Deans in our sample were deans in over 60 different institutions.  
3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable in our analysis is a researcher’s number of quality-weighted and 
coauthor-adjusted journal publications per year. Specifically, we use Handelsblatt points that 
take the number of co-authors and the attributed quality (or prestige) of a journal into consid-
eration with journals being given a weight between 0.05 and 1 (0 if the journal is not listed in 
the Handelsblatt journal ranking). For economists, we used the economics Handelsblatt jour-
nal list of 2011, for business administration researchers, we used the business administration 
Handelsblatt journal list of 2009. The weight provided by the ranking is divided by the num-
ber of co-authors. For example, a business researcher who publishes an article in Schmalen-
bach Business Review together with a second author, receives 0.15 journal article points.  
Given that publishing an article in a scientific journal takes time from the first submis-
sion until it is actually printed, we use a delayed publication variable to measure research out-
put for any given year. Ellison (2002) shows that in economics, the time lag until an article is 
published is two to three years. Building on this information and following Bolli and 
Schläpfer (2015) we measure publication output by the average of publication points two 
years and three years later than the current year (t+2 and t+3) (mean publication points). The 
implicit assumption is that time and effort invested in research will translate into (journal) 
publications two to three years later. For example, for a researcher with 0.3 publication points 
in t=2002, and 0,7 publication points in t=2003, the dependent variable mean publication 
points for the year 2000 would be (0.3+0.7)/2 = 0.5.  
Our main explanatory variables are dummy variables indicating whether in a specific 
year, a researcher was dean (dean=1) or not (dean=0), whether in a specific year, the re-
searcher was in a phase three years preceding a deanship (pre-dean=1) or not (pre-dean=0), 
and whether in a specific year, the researcher was in a phase three years succeeding a dean-
ship (post-dean=1) or not (post-dean=0). For example, for a researcher who was dean in the 
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year 2000 and 2001, the dean variable would take the value “1” for 2000 and 2001 and oth-
erwise zero. The pre-dean variable would take the value “1” for 1997, 1998 and 1999, and the 
post-dean variable would take the value “1” for 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
As previous literature has shown that publication productivity changes over the life cy-
cle (Ayaita, Backes-Gellner and Pull 2017; Backes-Gellner and Schlinghoff 2010; Rauber and 
Ursprung 2008,), we control for researchers’ career age (years since doctorate). We further 
control for year of birth, gender, field (business administration vs. economics), and we in-
clude two variables that might indicate a researcher’s research ability: age at doctorate and 
pre-doctorate publication points (see e.g. Bäker 2015, Bäker et al. 2016). Given that produc-
tivity measured by Handelsblatt points might increase over time, we further included decade 
dummies. 
3.3 Empirical Strategy  
We apply OLS panel regressions with fixed effects to analyze whether and how publica-
tion productivity is affected by deanship. Further, we apply random effects to study a poten-
tial self-selection into deanship. Moreover, given that our dependent variable of yearly publi-
cation points averaged over a sliding window of two years has many zero observations – we 
also conducted Tobit regressions as part of our robustness checks (see e.g. Hollis 2001). 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, panel A displays the descriptive statistics for the 1,110 researchers in the sam-
ple, out of which 138 (12 percent) have been dean in at least one point in time. The average 
number of yearly publication points calculated as the average over a sliding window of two 
years (mean publication points) is 0.116. This equals one single-authored top tier journal pub-
lication every ten years. Roughly one percent of yearly observations per researcher fall into 
the three years prior to becoming a dean (pre-dean). Given that 88 percent of researchers in 
our sample have not (yet) been dean and thus their share of yearly observations that are pre-
dean is zero, it is not surprising that on average only one percent of yearly observations per 
researcher are pre-dean. Similar mean values can be observed for the dean variable and the 
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post-dean variable.1 The percentage declines slightly for post-dean years because some re-
searchers were deans towards the end of the observation period, e.g., in 2009 or 2010, and 
their post-dean years are consequently not part of our sample.2 Mean year of birth in our sam-
ple is 1962, and 90 percent of our sample researchers are male. Roughly 53 percent of our 
sample researchers work in the field of business administration. Average age when obtaining 
the doctorate is 30 years and the sum of pre-doctorate publication points is 0.03. Table 1, pan-
el B shows the descriptive statistics on a person-year basis.  
Table 1, panel C provides information for the deans in our sample (at individual re-
searcher level). For the deans in our sample, we observe on average 3.058 years pre-dean (the 
number is slightly above the pre-defined 3 year spell because some researchers in our sample 
have been dean more than once), 2.478 years during deanship (i.e., on average, the deans in 
our sample serve in the office for about 2.5 years) and 1.775 years post-dean (the number is 
below the pre-defined 3 year spell because of those deans that were dean towards the end of 
our observation period such that not the full three years post-dean are observable). 
Table 2 shows the correlations between variables on the level of the individual re-
searcher, Table 3 displays the correlations between variables on a person-year level.  
                                               
1 The mean value for the dean variable is 0.011, which equals the average number of years in the dean’s 
office for researchers who were dean (2.478, panel C of Table 1) divided by the average number of yearly 
observations for deans (29.130, panel C), times the share of deans in the sample (138/1,110). Thus, the mean 
value 0.011 represents the time spells (observation years) of deans among all time spells (observation years). 
The share of researchers in our data who had been a dean during the observation period is about 12.5%. 
2 When running a balanced panel estimation in which only researchers are included for which all three post-
deanship years are available, we find similar results. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Panel A: Individual Researcher Level 
Mean publication points 1’110 0.116 0.118 0 0.860 
Pre-dean (1=yes) 1’110 0.014 0.039 0 0.2 
Dean (1=yes) 1’110 0.011 0.036 0 0.346 
Post-dean (1=yes) 1’110 0.007 0.025 0 0.177 
Year of birth 1’110 1962 9.219 1930 1983 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 1’110 0.900 0.300 0 1 
Business administration 
(1=yes, 0=economics) 
1’110 0.531 0.499 0 1 
Age at doctorate 1’110 30.022 2.390 22 40 
Pre-doctorate publication points 1’110 0.028 0.077 0 1 
Number of years in data 1’110 20.466 9.523 3 43 
Panel B: Person-Year Observation Level 
Mean publication points 22’717 0.107 0.185 0 2.263 
Pre-dean (1=yes) 22’717 0.019 0.135 0 1 
Dean (1=yes) 22’717 0.015 0.122 0 1 
Post-dean (1=yes) 22’717 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Years since doctorate 22’717 7.007 9.229 -5 46 
Panel C: Deans (Individual Researcher Level) 
Mean publication points 138 0.102 0.112 0 0.629 
Years pre-dean 138 3.058 0.712 1 6 
Years as dean 138 2.478 1.768 0 9 
Years post-dean 138 1.775 1.580 0 6 
Year of birth 138 1954 7.962 1941 1971 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 138 0.949 0.220 0 1 
Business administration 
(1=yes, 0=economics) 
138 0.558 0.498 0 1 
Age at doctorate 138 29.348 2.214 24 35 
Pre-doctorate publication points 138 0.032 0.118 0 1 
Number of years in data 138 29.130 8.423 13 43 
Notes: The pre- and post-dean dummy variables (Panel A and B) indicate the three years prior taking on a dean 
position, and after leaving the office, respectively. Years pre-dean, years as dean and years post-dean (Panel C) 
indicate the average number of years that we observe the deans in our sample in a pre-dean phase, during dean-
ship, and in a post-dean phase, respectively. 
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Table 2: Correlation Analysis on Individual Researcher Level (N= 1’110) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Mean publication 
points 
1.000        
(2) Pre-dean (1=yes) -0.033 1.000       
(3) Dean (1=yes) -0.040 0.767 
*** 
1.000      
(4) Post-dean (1=yes) -0.052 
* 
0.672 
*** 
0.729 
*** 
1.000     
(5) Year of birth 0.190 
*** 
-0.261 
*** 
-0.259 
*** 
-0.316 
*** 
1.000    
(6) Gender (1=male, 
0=female) 
0.076 
** 
0.046 0.062 
** 
0.073 
** 
-0.177 
*** 
1.000   
(7) Business admin-
istration (1=yes) 
-0.107 
*** 
0.047 0.034 0.021 0.034 -0.043 1.000  
(8) Age at doctorate -0.120 
*** 
-0.082 
*** 
-0.059 
* 
-0.091 
*** 
0.052 
* 
0.013 0.013 1.000 
(9) Pre-doctorate pub-
lication points 
0.201 
*** 
0.024 0.058
* 
0.020 0.071 
** 
0.034 0.019 0.077 
** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 3: Correlation analysis on Person-Year Observation Level (N= 22’717) 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Mean publication points 1.000     
(2) Pre-dean (1=yes) 0.006 1.000    
(3) Dean (1=yes) -0.002 -0.017** 1.000   
(4) Post-dean (1=yes) -0.008 -0.014* -0.013* 1.000  
(5) Years since doctorate -0.048*** 0.111*** 0.135*** 0.143*** 1.000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4.2 Multivariate Results 
Next, we apply panel regression with fixed effects to test how research output might be 
affected by taking a position as a dean (H1 and H2). Further, we apply random effects to 
study whether deans are different from non-deans (H3). Model (1) in Table 4 shows the re-
sults from the fixed effects regression, model (2) shows the results from the random effects 
regression. All estimations include the whole sample, i.e. they include all person-year obser-
vations for researchers who were dean at some point in their career and all observations for 
researchers who have not (yet) been dean within the observation period. 
In model (1), the coefficients for the dummy variables indicating dean years and post-
dean years are significantly negative, hinting at the plausibility of H1 and H2. Our results thus 
indicate that there is a resource effect such that leadership in academia reduces a researcher’s 
publication productivity during and potentially also post deanship. Also, during deanship, 
researchers might develop a “taste for service” and – after their office has ended – take on 
additional positions in the scientific community, thus further reducing their post-dean publica-
tion productivity.  
With respect to selection into deanship, the pre-dean coefficient in our random effects 
estimation in model (2) of Table 4 is not significant, suggesting that researchers that become 
deans are not a negative selection in terms of their publication productivity. That is, our data 
does not support H3 on a negative self-selection effect. 
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Table 4: Results from Fixed- Effects and Random-Effects Panel Regression 
  
(1) 
Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Random Effects 
Pre-dean (1=yes) -0.00467 -0.00430 
 (0.00801) (0.00802) 
 0.560 0.592 
Dean (1=yes) -0.0190* -0.0189* 
 (0.00976) (0.00973) 
 0.0520 0.0522 
Post-dean (1=yes) -0.0265** -0.0264** 
 (0.0115) (0.0114) 
 0.0213 0.0208 
Years since doctorate 0.00360*** 0.00358*** 
 (0.000473) (0.000470) 
 6.1e-14 2.6e-14 
Year of birth  0.00473*** 
  (0.000558) 
  2.3e-17 
Gender (1=male, 0=female)  0.0412*** 
  (0.00821) 
  5.16e-07 
Business administration   -0.0267*** 
(1=yes, 0=economics)  (0.00674) 
  7.32e-05 
Age at doctorate  -0.00514*** 
  (0.00147) 
  0.000486 
Pre-doctorate publication points  0.297*** 
  (0.0480) 
  6.09e-10 
Decade dummies Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0829*** -9.065*** 
 (0.00662) (1.113) 
 9.6e-34 3.8e-16 
   
Observations 22,717 22,717 
Within R-squared 0.031 0.031 
Between R-squared 0.023 0.113 
Overall R-squared 0.011 0.069 
Number of id 1,110 1,110 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values below standard errors. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference decade: 2000 – 2010. 
To analyze whether the effects are independent on when a researcher became dean in his 
or her career, we distinguish researchers that became deans comparatively early in their career 
(i.e. that are likely to have been rotated into office) from those that became deans at a later 
stage in their career (i.e. that likely self-selected into the office). Empirically, we split the 
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sample at the median career age of becoming a dean, i.e. the median number of years that 
have passed since obtaining the PhD at the time of becoming dean.  
Models (1) and (3) in Table 5 show the estimation results when reducing the sample to 
“early deans” as compared to those researchers that have not (yet) become dean, models (2) 
and (4) contain the results for the “late deans” compared to those researchers that have not 
(yet) become dean.3  
First, we again find no indication for a negative self-selection based on publication 
productivity, neither for the early nor for the late deans: the coefficient for the pre-dean 
dummy in our random effects regression (models 3 and 4) is non-significant for the early as 
well as the late deans. Second, in our fixed effects regression we find no reduction in publica-
tion productivity during or post deanship for early deans (model 1). Third, we do find a de-
creased publication productivity for late deans during and after deanship (model 2): For late 
deans, yearly publication points decrease by 0.03–0.05 per year, which is about one third of 
the yearly publication output (see Table 1). Hence, researchers who became dean late in their 
career drive the overall negative resource effect of deanship on publication productivity dur-
ing and post deanship (Table 4).  
Presumably, these late deans took a deliberate late career development shift towards a 
stronger engagement in the scientific community and becoming a dean. These deans might 
rather follow a conviction than simply being rotated into the office, and they might put in 
more time and effort into their deanship. As a result, their publication productivity during 
deanship and potentially also beyond might be lower. During deanship, they might develop a 
taste for service to the community, or their decision to become a dean might already indicate a 
shift towards stronger engagement in the scientific community. Thus, after deanship, re-
searchers might also take up other offices and tasks (e.g., they become journal editors, organ-
ize conferences and serve on boards and committees). 
                                               
3 The age of becoming a dean is empirically related to our control variables “year of birth” and “age at doctor-
ate”. More recently born researchers in our sample are more likely to be “early” deans since they have fewer 
“late career years” in which they could become a “late dean”. Also, “early” deans were older when they obtained 
their doctorate. 
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Table 5: Results for Early and Late Deans 
  Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 
Early Deans 
(1) 
Late Deans 
(2) 
Early Deans 
(3) 
Late Deans 
(4) 
Pre-dean (1=yes) 0.00741 -0.00694 0.00831 -0.00712 
 (0.0106) (0.00996) (0.0106) (0.0100) 
 0.486 0.486 0.434 0.476 
Dean (1=yes) -0.00667 -0.0319*** -0.00633 -0.0322*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0117) (0.0158) (0.0117) 
 0.675 0.00648 0.688 0.00606 
Post-dean (1=yes) -0.00243 -0.0491*** -0.00154 -0.0500*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0119) (0.0186) (0.0117) 
 0.897 3.75e-05 0.934 1.87e-05 
Years since doctorate 0.00421*** 0.00380*** 0.00419*** 0.00378*** 
 (0.000503) (0.000485) (0.000499) (0.000482) 
 1.7e-16 01.2e-14 4.7e-17 4.6e-15 
Year of birth   0.00512*** 0.00500*** 
   (0.000578) (0.000553) 
   8.1e-19 1.5e-19 
Gender (1=male, 
0=female) 
  0.0402*** 0.0424*** 
  (0.00833) (0.00837) 
   1.36e-06 4.06e-07 
Business administration    -0.0292*** -0.0242*** 
(1=yes, 0=economics)   (0.00697) (0.00688) 
   2.75e-05 0.000441 
Age at doctorate   -0.00487*** -0.00451*** 
   (0.00155) (0.00141) 
   0.00166 0.00137 
Pre-doctorate publication 
points 
  0.269*** 0.345*** 
  (0.0462) (0.0564) 
   6.01e-09 9.31e-10 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 0.0539 0.0102 0.0574 0.0116 
Constant 0.0812*** 0.0811*** -9.836*** -9.614*** 
 (0.00651) (0.00657) (1.154) (1.098) 
 2.1e-33 7.9e-33 1.6e-17 2.0e-18 
     
Observations 20,534 21,209 20,534 21,209 
Within R-squared 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.033 
Between R-squared 0.020 0.029 0.106 0.119 
Overall R-squared 0.001 0.000 0.069 0.074 
Number of id 1,046 1,056 1,046 1,056 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values below standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference decade: 2000 – 2010. 
The number of observations in models 1 and 2 of Table 5 do not add up to the number of observations in model 
1 of Table 4 due to a large number of researcher-year observations belonging to researchers who have not (yet) 
been dean, which are included in both, model 1 and 2 of Table 5. The same refers to models 3 and 4 in Table 5 
as compared to model 2 in Table 4. 
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4.3 Robustness Checks  
As a first robustness check, we extended our analysis of post-dean effects not only to 
three years after deanship, but we also include later periods (up to 15 years after deanship, see 
Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). We find the negative post-dean effects to be persistent 
over the years, and we again find them to be driven by the late deans.  
As a further robustness test, we ran our analysis separately for the 50% top and 50% bot-
tom researchers – where top or bottom were calculated based on the average publication 
productivity per researcher. Results (see Table B in the appendix) show that the top 50% per-
formers mainly drive our results. 
Lastly, we ran a random effects Tobit analysis (see Table D in the appendix), as the de-
pendent variable of publication output is censored at zero. Again, we find our results to be 
robust: Dean and post-dean years are negative, and the late deans drive the effect. 
4.4 Illustrative qualitative evidence  
To enhance our understanding of the mechanisms behind potential effects of deanship 
on research output, we can also draw on nine illustrative interviews with deans at business 
and/or economics faculties. The interviews were conducted in fall 2013, shortly after the end 
of the observation period in our quantitative dataset. 
The qualitative evidence clearly supports a resource effect during deanship: Several of our 
interviewees point to the office as being time-consuming (e.g., interviewees #4, #5 and #7). 
Interviewee #7 would give his successor the following advice:  
"Do not hope that you publish a lot in the next three years. That's important 
because it makes you frustrated, because if you really have the idea you 
could somehow do most things like before and then just realize that this is 
not the case, you either get very frustrated or you invest so much time that 
you somehow suffer otherwise." 
Concerning self-selection into the office, we asked our interviewees for their motivation to 
become a dean. Five out of nine deans stated that they were rotated into the office (interview-
ees #1, #2, #3, #4, #6). The following quotes are exemplary:  
„I did not apply [for the position], it rotates at our institution and whoever 
does not act too stupidly has to do it someday…” (interviewee #6), 
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"no, no-one volunteers here at the faculty" (interviewee #1);  
„everyone is so unmotivated to become dean that there would be no substi-
tute candidate” (interviewee #4).  
To the contrary, when asked for his personal motivation to become a dean, interviewee #9 
who was not rotated into the office elaborates on two different “types” of deans: re-active 
deans that focus on solving problems that can no longer be ignored and that need an immedi-
ate solution as opposed to active ones that aim at literally shaping their faculties during their 
deanship. Having actively decided to run for the office, he follows the second model:  
„Let me put it this way, there are, in my view, two basic types, strongly sim-
plified, how to practice a deanship. One is the "fire extinguisher" who is 
waiting for something to escalate in the department and then comes to look 
for solutions, but does not become active on its own. And the other is the 
"designer", who gives himself a project agenda, also has a plan and imple-
ments this. So, the passive vs. the active, maybe we'll do it that way. These 
are the basic possibilities, they represent completely different styles, also re-
ferring to the question how to tackle things and how to exercise the office. I 
myself follow the second model.“ (interviewee #9)  
That is, our interviewee supports the view that deans which are not rotated into the office 
(presumably the “later” deans) might put in more time and effort into their deanship.  
Concerning the question whether “early deans” are more often rotated into the office than 
“late deans”, our qualitative evidence does not offer many insights, as by chance our inter-
viewees are rather young. Descriptively, we see a small difference between the average age of 
becoming a dean for those who were rotated into office (41 years of age) and those that be-
came dean without a rotation system (43 years of age). 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
There is no negative self-selection into deanship in the sense that researchers running 
for the office were to show a lower pre-dean publication productivity than their peers. This 
applies to researchers that become dean early in their career and that are presumably rotated 
into the office, and it also applies to researchers that become dean late in their career and that 
most likely deliberately decide to run for the office. Judged by their pre-dean publication 
productivity, deans are undistinguishable from their peers. 
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During and post-deanship, however, deanship decreases research productivity over the 
whole sample of deans: Publication productivity is reduced, both during and after being a 
dean as compared to those researchers that never became dean. Interestingly, however, if we 
split the sample this is only the case for those researchers that become dean late in their ca-
reers but not for researchers that become dean early in their career. Thus, it seems that the late 
deans undertake a deliberate late career shift, and advance a second career towards serving the 
scientific community, in which they invest considerable time and resources that reduce their 
publication productivity during deanship and beyond. Alternatively, those late deans might 
have developed a taste for service during their deanship. 
Interpreting the results is rather speculative. In particular, we cannot observe whether 
these late deans are actually more active in their office than early deans, but it seems likely 
that they really invest in their “second career” and want to have an impact as a dean since we 
observe that they cut down on own research output. What we also do not know is whether this 
potentially increased activity by the late career deans translates into more successful faculty 
management. But, with more active and engaged deans, strategic agenda setting and change 
initiatives would at least seem more likely – rendering late career deans a potentially im-
portant asset in a volatile environment with increasingly challenging demands and a stronger 
need for changes in how Faculties are functioning and governed. 
For a good university governance, this raises multiple questions. The first question to be 
answered is whether a Faculty faces major and potentially disruptive challenges or not. If not, 
i.e. if a Faculty can be coursed through smoothly without too much of an engagement, then it 
can most likely be also led by an early dean, i.e., a rather junior faculty member who – poten-
tially – is more concerned with keeping up his or her own publication record during the office 
and has few interest in change. In this case, rotating researchers into the dean’s office might in 
fact be an effective university governance mechanism. However, in times when a Faculty fac-
es “stormy waters” and expects major and potentially disruptive challenges, it will rather need 
a dean that deliberately runs for the office as a second career and is ready to invest considera-
ble time and resources – even if that reduces own publication productivity. 
Second, our findings also show that – under the current governance structure – there is 
no negative self-selection into deanship concerning publication productivity: Neither early 
deans nor late deans show a lower publication productivity when they enter the office. This is 
an important finding, because – as Bäker and Goodall (2017) have convincingly argued – ac-
ademic leadership should be expert leadership to be really effective. Hence, if a Faculty ex-
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pects to face major challenges and thus wants to recur on a professional dean who whole-
heartedly runs the office and pushes for change, it will still be advisable to choose a dean with 
a good publication record and inside knowledge on the academic production function, i.e. to 
choose an expert leader, and not to induce a negative self-selection with respect to research 
productivity when the governance regime shifts towards professional deanship.  
Of course, our study is not without limitations. A first and obvious limitation is that we 
cannot distinguish correlation from causality. The second limitation is that we rely on data 
from one specific institutional context and from two specific disciplines. Future studies might 
want to analyze in how far our results can be substantiated in other contexts and in other dis-
ciplines. The third limitation is that we do not have data on the amount of working time that 
deans devote to their office and thus can only speculate how the early deans manage to com-
pensate for the reduced resources during deanship and why this differs from the effects for the 
late deans. However, our study gives a first indication in this respect, and future studies might 
want to further explore this question. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Results from Fixed- Effects and Random-Effects Panel Regression: Looking 
further into the future 
  (1) Fixed Effects 
(2) 
Random Effects 
    
Pre-dean (1=yes) -0.00990 -0.00883 
 (0.00815) (0.00818) 
 0.225 0.280 
Dean (1=yes) -0.0316*** -0.0306*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0113) 
 0.00555 0.00671 
Post-dean (1=yes) -0.0393*** -0.0383*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0128) 
 0.00237 0.00276 
4-6 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0431** -0.0417** 
 (0.0169) (0.0169) 
 0.0108 0.0138 
7-9 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0575*** -0.0558*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0185) 
 0.00194 0.00263 
10-12 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0524** -0.0502** 
 (0.0209) (0.0210) 
 0.0124 0.0167 
13-15 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0221 -0.0192 
 (0.0331) (0.0341) 
 0.505 0.574 
Constant 0.0829*** -9.034*** 
 (0.00662) (1.112) 
 9.3e-34 4.4e-16 
   
Observations 22,662 22,662 
Within R-squared 0.033 0.033 
Between R-squared 0.023 0.112 
Overall R-squared 0.001 0.069 
Number of id 1,110 1,110 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values below standard errors. *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: years since doctorate, year of birth, gender, business administration, age at 
doctorate, pre-doctorate publication points, dummies for decades. 
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Table A2: Results for Early and Late Deans: Looking further into the future 
  Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 Early Deans 
(1) 
Late Deans 
(2) 
Early Deans 
(3) 
Late Deans 
(4) 
      
Pre-dean (1=yes) 0.00916 -0.0158 0.0107 -0.0155 
 (0.0118) (0.0100) (0.0117) (0.0101) 
 0.436 0.116 0.358 0.124 
Dean (1=yes) -0.0101 -0.0510*** -0.00908 -0.0507*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0123) (0.0177) (0.0123) 
 0.572 3.87e-05 0.609 3.79e-05 
Post-dean (1=yes) -0.00761 -0.0685*** -0.00570 -0.0689*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0133) (0.0200) (0.0128) 
 0.707 3.13e-07 0.776 7.01e-08 
4-6 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0162 -0.0680*** -0.0141 -0.0681*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0189) (0.0261) (0.0185) 
 0.530 0.000327 0.591 0.000229 
7-9 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0381 -0.0734*** -0.0353 -0.0732*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0272) (0.0248) (0.0274) 
 0.130 0.00709 0.155 0.00747 
10-12 years post dean (1=yes) -0.0156 -0.0917*** -0.0120 -0.0914*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0251) (0.0297) (0.0253) 
 0.605 0.000266 0.686 0.000301 
13-15 years post dean (1=yes) 0.0127 -0.0792* 0.0158 -0.0777* 
 (0.0415) (0.0462) (0.0432) (0.0471) 
 0.760 0.0869 0.715 0.0987 
Constant 0.0810*** 0.0809*** -9.837*** -9.617*** 
 (0.00650) (0.00654) (1.146) (1.096) 
 2.7e-33 6.6e-33 9.0e-18 1.8e-18 
     
Observations 20,522 21,166 20,522 21,166 
Within R-squared 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.036 
Between R-squared 0.021 0.027 0.105 0.120 
Overall R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.069 0.076 
Number of id 1,046 1,056 1,046 1,056 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values below standard errors. *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: years since doctorate, year of birth, gender, business administration, age at doctor-
ate, pre-doctorate publication points, dummies for decades. 
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Table B: Results for the Bottom 50% vs. the Top 50% Researchers 
  Fixed Effects Random Effects 
 
Bottom 50% 
(1) 
Top 50% 
(2) 
Bottom 50% 
(3) 
Top 50% 
(4) 
          
Pre-dean (1=yes) 0.00923* -0.0243 0.00981* -0.0250 
 (0.00523) (0.0164) (0.00520) (0.0162) 
 0.0781 0.138 0.0592 0.124 
Dean (1=yes) 0.00577 -0.0540** 0.00618 -0.0553** 
 (0.00562) (0.0228) (0.00544) (0.0225) 
 0.304 0.0180 0.256 0.0139 
Post-dean (1=yes) -0.00381 -0.0520* -0.00405 -0.0532* 
 (0.00483) (0.0283) (0.00462) (0.0276) 
 0.430 0.0667 0.380 0.0538 
Constant 0.0223*** 0.156*** -2.675*** -8.581*** 
 (0.00384) (0.0122) (0.484) (2.163) 
 9.68e-09 8.7e-33 3.22e-08 7.25e-05 
     
Observations 12,338 10,379 12,338 10,379 
Within R-squared 0.007 0.068 0.007 0.068 
Between R-squared 0.119 0.003 0.192 0.040 
Overall R-squared 0.002 0.034 0.041 0.063 
Number of id 554 556 554 556 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values below standard errors. *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: years since doctorate, year of birth, gender, business administration, age at doc-
torate, pre-doctorate publication points, dummies for decades. 
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Table C: Tobit-Results from Random-Effects Panel Regression 
 (1) All 
(2) 
Early Deans 
(3)  
Late Deans 
Pre-dean (1=yes) 0.00826 0.0219 0.00589 
 (0.0120) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
 0.490 0.172 0.712 
Dean (1=yes) -0.0261* -0.00695 -0.0536*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0184) (0.0204) 
 0.0563 0.706 0.00862 
Post-dean (1=yes) -0.0413** -0.000538 -0.0958*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0216) (0.0254) 
 0.0116 0.980 0.000162 
Years since doctorate 0.00738*** 0.00820*** 0.00788*** 
 (0.000619) (0.000653) (0.000647) 
 8.9e-33 3.2e-36 3.9e-34 
Year of birth 0.0104*** 0.0107*** 0.0110*** 
 (0.000854) (0.000900) (0.000884) 
 6.0e-34 2.2e-32 2.1e-35 
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.0628*** 0.0613*** 0.0633*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0192) 
 0.000898 0.00120 0.00101 
Business administration  -0.0720*** -0.0756*** -0.0671*** 
(1=yes, 0=economics) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
 7.67e-11 2.3e-11 3.00e-09 
Age at doctorate -0.00816*** -0.00778*** -0.00729*** 
 (0.00240) (0.00246) (0.00245) 
 0.000687 0.00160 0.00293 
Pre-doctorate publication points 0.586*** 0.553*** 0.671*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0742) (0.0807) 
 3.2e-16 9.4e-14 9.8e-17 
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes  
Constant -20.15*** -20.75*** -21.38*** 
 (1.693) (1.787) (1.754) 
 1.1e-32 3.6e-31 3.4e-34 
Observations 22,717 20,534 21,209 
Number of id 1,110 1,046 1,056 
AIC 8560.805 7864.441 8138.866 
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values below standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
